The research communitiy has shown considerable interest in studying access control in single Trusted Operating Systems (TOS). However, interactions among multiple TOSs have attracted relatively little attention. In this paper, we propose a Collaborative Role-Based Access Control (C-RBAC) model for distributed systems in which accesses across system domain boundaries are allowed. Access entities in a TOS vary in time. The changes in the organizational structure of the access entities in one system may influence other cooperating systems. In addition, policyfreeness, domain and rule conflicts are possible. These problems restrict the flexibility and scalability of coordination. We propose drafting a metacomponent to play the role of a coordinator in multi-domain role-based access control. It is then possible to impart flexibility and scalability in a secure fashion. Experimental studies of the proposed model with the Network File System and SELinux system support our conclusion. key words: role based access control, multi-domain security, trusted operating systems, distributed systems security
Introduction
Network infrastructure is rapidly being put firmly in place allowing widespread cooperation across composite computer systems. The Trusted Operating System (TOS) is a primary example of this trend. The TOS is an operating system which includes a security kernel providing protection from diverse threats. The security kernel approach assists in realizing the reference monitor with a trusted computing base (TCB) [1] which enforces the security policy of a given system [2] .
Beyond the discretionary access control (DAC) of the traditional UNIX OS, workers on the TOS enforce enhanced policy versions in order to accommodate their organizational missions thereby achieving mandatory access control (MAC). However, interactions among the TOSs, accesses from subjects in a TOS to objects in a different TOS, have not received due attention. We image the distributed environment of the TOSs into a multi-domain security environment [3] , [4] , and exploit the inter-domain access.
Distributed TOSs involve several systems. Many problems are encountered when the access crosses the system domain boundary. A fundamental issue in the multi-domain † † The author is with the Faculty of Computer Science and Communication Engineering, Kyushu University, Fukuoka-shi, 812-8581 Japan.
a) E-mail: kimhc@gist.ac.kr security concerns the diversity of security policies being enforced in each system. A change of access entities in one TOS influences other TOSs. Flexibility in security policy configuration governing the cooperative participants is imperative. A composition of two or more secure sub-systems may create subtle security loopholes [5] . Interactions among the TOSs may be difficult, if not impossible, in such a case, because access entities of each system domain have to include the access entities of the other domains and need to negotiate relations among respective policies. If left out of serious consideration, it may trigger undesirable policy conflicts. Due to these conflicts, the scalability of cooperation may be severely restricted because several domains can not be combined in a secure manner.
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model [6] - [8] has been accepted in many computing systems as it offers flexibility in enforcement, and policy neutrality. It is also easy to administer. However, many RBAC approaches have assumed a single security domain. Hence, most RBAC models are not suited for access control in a multi-domain environment.
In this paper, we present an extended model of RBAC for multi-domain environments. It supports fine-grained multi-domain authorization. It is sufficiently flexible to support a large number of systems. It takes into consideration issues connected with prevention of domain conflicts, rule conflicts, and policy freeness. We introduce a cooperation domain wherein the inter-system collaboration is invoked on an interoperable task basis. Such a task process can access permissions across its own boundary domain when the collaboration context condition is satisfied.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, RBAC and the multi-domain assumptions are presented. We also investigate possible conflicts in a multi-domain environment. We suggest our RBAC model for multi-domain systems in section 4. An example and its implementation in a distributed TOS are given in section 5. Discussion will be given in section 6. The paper ends with conclusions in section 7.
Background

Multi-Domain Security
The subject is defined as an active entity that initiates access requests and operates on granted objects. The object is Copyright c 2005 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers a passive entity that is a target of an access. The representative example of a subject in a TOS is a process. Examples of objects in TOS are: files, devices, network ports, or any other resource that can be used by subjects. However, sometimes, a subject can be an object and vice versa under the dynamically varying access patterns in a system or an organization. A subject has to undergo successful authentication. In a multi-domain environment, a group of access entities, subjects and objects, are bound by the notion of a domain.
In general, the domain is considered to be an abstraction of an organization with the intent to demarcate a boundary for access entities such as subjects and objects. From another perspective, the domain is viewed as the scope of a specific set of security rules that apply, not to a network but, for example, to a single distributed application [9] . With these notions, ECMA (European Computer Manufactures Association) defines the security domain as follows:
• Security domain : A bound of security objects and security subjects to which a single security policy, executed by a single administrator, is applied.
In many organizational systems incorporating distributed TOS, subjects and objects may exist under different security authorities. Each of the authorities may enforce its own policy that may be quite different from the others. Hence the definition of a domain can be stretched to include policy domain reflecting policy diversity and jurisdictional domain reflecting exclusiveness of authorities [10] .
Role-Based Access Control
The main characteristic of RBAC is that it does not directly associate a subject with an object. Instead, by conceiving the role which represents job functions or responsibilities in a system or an organization Fig. 1 , RBAC greatly eases access control administration. A conventional DAC or a MAC system usually involves direct association between a subject and an object. If there are hundreds of thousands of access entities-a possibility in large enterprises-administrators of DAC or MAC system have difficulty in managing all the access entities. A specific role gathers a set of necessary permissions-defined as the cartesian product of the set of operations and the set of objects-in order to perform a certain duty. Hence, if an administrator of the RBAC system wants to make a subject perform a given duty, then the subject is simply assigned an appropriate role.
The abstraction of role offers several advantages as it enables us to co-opt many useful methods from the field of software engineering. Due to the similarity of roles and class objects, one can adopt object oriented approach just as for class objects. For example, if a role is once codified, then reusability amounts to reassigning subjects to the role of the same responsibility. Similar duties can be easily constructed by modifying only a few attributes of an existing role.
The RBAC models have been shown to be policy neutral in the sense of using role hierarchies and constraints [11] and this is very important and well-recognized by the research community. Nyanchama et al. [12] , have simulated MAC using RBAC by handling each of the role contexts as independent security levels of information. Osborn et al. [13] also describe how to configure role-based access control to enforce MAC and DAC polices. They also demonstrated the simple security property and the *-property of lattice based access control using the role hierarchies and constraints on sessions. DAC is also shownby setting administrative roles and a regular role-to implement the functionality at the discretion of the user.
In this regard, RBAC enables the enforcement of various security policies which can vary in an organization-byorganization basis. It is reasonable to suppose that all the domains, which reflect a paticular type of organization or a sub-organization with the possibility of enforcing heterogeneous policies, implement their own policies using RBAC model under policy neutrality. This is assumed in this paper unless otherwise stated.
Investigation of Multi-Domain Authorization
In this section, we analyse policy conflicts that may arise in multi-domain environments if RBAC is applied directly by component-mapping. The issue of indispensability of a cooperation domain is also discussed.
RBAC Conflicts in a Multi-Domain Environment
Kühnhauser [16] classifies inter-domain actions into three classes while identifying related security aspects. This classification is based on the influential boundary of policy domains and presents conflict conditions which are discovered from the nature of inter-domain access, viz., domain conflict, rule conflict and policy freeness. Here we briefly describe the conflict problem in terms of multi-domain relational RBAC. Detailed description may be found in [10] .
In RBAC models, the abstraction of organizational functions and responsibilities as roles offers many benefits. Roles directly support organization-specific security policies in an administration-friendly manner. Hence, there is a strong temptation to adopt roles to mediate inter-domain accesses directly even in multi-domain authorization systems just as is done in a single domain system. Intuitively, we can think of simple approaches which are pairwise associations of the RBAC components across the domain boundary. Such association may assume the form of (i) cross-domain user assignment Fig. 2 (a) and (ii) cross-domain permission assignment Fig. 2(b) . Also, the methods (i) and (ii) can be used simultaneously as method (iii) Fig. 2(c) . A fourth type of association is through role-to-role translation.
The cross-domain user-to-role and the role-to-permission mappings may lead to domain-conflicts. Domain conflict occurs if at least one of the access entities, subject or object, belongs to more than one domain. In case (i) Fig. 2(a) , a subject has two responsibilities, hence conflict of interest occurs. A conflict of interest exists when one person can obtain sensitive information on a competing class. When a subject overlaps two policy authorities, then that subject can perform management tasks upon two different sets of targets. This is an instance of conflict of interest between two competing policy domains.
Case (ii) involves an object handled by two responsibilities Fig. 2 (b), leading to a possibility of conflicts from multiple managers [17] . Because there are two or more policies providing rules to an object, conflicts among rules can arise. One can think of the following situation: Conflict of availability is possible when a policy requires it (the object) to be in service, while the other requires it to be out of service. This conflict is very similar to the conflict of privacy except that the resource is a specific type of information which has the property of confidentiality.
Moreover, we identify a conflict of duties when a subject has rights to an object via two different policy domains Fig. 2 (c) with the approach (iii). A subject may be accorded multiple responsibilities in respect of a given object leading to its possible abuse.
The cross-domain role-to-role translations trigger the situation of rule-conflict or policy-freeness. A rule conflict occurs if and only if more than one security policy yields a rule for a single access. If there is no security policy that yields a rule for an access, then it comes under the policyfree state. Infiltration and covert promotion are examples of possible problems. An example from I-RBAC model [14] uses role translation between two domains. A translation
implies that the following hierarchical relations are satisfied:
This amounts to saying that the role R X in Domain P1 is permitted to enjoy the privileges of the role R B in Domain P2 , though there is no direct association between R X and R B .
With this relation, roles between two policy domains are translated. A role translated to a role in the other domain can be assigned permissions of that role. However, this kind of model might have problems if more than two policy domains are involved. Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3 (b) illustrate these problems. Fig. 3(a) shows a possible situation in which a role R A is mapped to a role R B and R B is, in turn, translated to a role R C . Assuming that all these domains are pairwise exclusive, one can discern an implicit mapping between R A and R C . Although there is no explicit translation rule between R A and R C , an implicit translation occurs. Therefore, the situation exemplifies a policy-free state.
In Fig. 3(b) , a role R B is mapped to R C , R C to R D , and R D to R A . The role R A is an ancestor of R B in the same policy domain and others are included in their own domains. Then, there are chances that the role R B uses permissions of role R A though this is counter to policy P2. This is tantamount to saying that R B is a descendant of R A . This situation occurs because there is a conflict between the rule in policy domain Domain P2 and a rule generated by inter-domain translations. Hence, this situation causes a rule-conflict.
We classify domain conflict, rule conflict, and policyfreeness with corresponding multi-domain RBAC configuration in Table 1 .
As an example of a conflict in TOS, we consider the following scenario. System cooperation among multiple autonomous Trusted OSs-for example, sharing file systems using NFS-involves inter-system access by a subject in one system of an object in another system. The following situation is possible: some RBAC TOS may be interacting with a MLS-based TOS which enforces multi level security pol- icy from level 1 (Top secret) through 4 (Unclassified). If a level 3 user of MLS system conspires with others not in that system, then a condition of covert promotion develops. One may be able to access objects at higher levels, such as level 2 or even level 1. This violates the MLS policy resulting in rule conflict. Hence, access control configuring with external systems must be done with care.
The Indispensability of Cooperation Domain
Due to conflict problems, direct role translations among domains can not provide scalability though the provision of scalability is very important in distributed environments. We encounter three major problems here: confusion of access entities (domain conflict); implicit relations replacing explicit rules (policy-freeness); collision of inter-domain and intra-domain rules (rule conflict).
To avoid these situations, one must separate each policy domain clearly so that vague states and implicitly generated rules are prohibited. We have taken the Metapolicy [15] approach in order to separate the policy domains effectively.
Metapolicy is policy about policies. It coordinates access between heterogeneous policy domains. Introducing metapolicy into the realm of RBAC, we can clearly separate local access from inter-domain (cooperative) access. The cooperation domain is governed by metapolicy, and hence it generates explicit rules for all the inter-domain accesses. Moreover, access entities of each domain can not be tied down due to clear isolation of each local domain from the cooperation domain. This seperates every local rule from every foreign rule.
Extended RBAC Model for Multi-Domain Authorization
In this section, we propose an extended model of the RBAC for multi-domain environments.
The Collaborative RBAC Model
The core of the Collaborative RBAC (C-RBAC) model Fig. 4 is the Cooperation Role (also called Meta Role). As a role is a job function or a named duty in an organization, the cooperation role represents a job function of a cooperative task. Translation capabilities that give rise to cooperation roles are given for each security administrator. All the interested parties constitute an interoperable domain by agreeing on cooperation roles and assigning their permissions to those roles. Assignment of permissions to the cooperation roles are fixed by translation relations between roles and cooperation roles. By introducing the cooperation role, a virtual domain can be built in a natural way. This virtual domain acts as a metapolicy domain which abstracts the interdomain collaboration. We concentrate on the clear separation of inter-domain sessions from local sessions with inter-operable user assignment (IUA) and role translation (RT ) relations. IUA is the assignment relation by which a user of a domain has a duty for inter-domain actions. RT is the translation relation which builds cooperation duties by collecting roles needed to perform the cooperative task. The direction of RT relation is one-way from local domain to cooperation domain. Consequently, permissions of each role are gathered into a cooperation role. These permissions are the privilege of the cooperation duty.
IUA and RT relations are valid only under the cooperation negotiation. With one-way property of RT relation, it is impossible to configure a formation in which transfer of privileges are feasible along with the chain of domains.
All inter-domain accesses are granted or denied via cooperation roles which are formed by the agreement of each domain. The decisions on inter-domain access have to be taken subject to the inter-domain policy. The agreement process can be executed with the help of mature public key based cryptographic technology.
The main components of the core C-RBAC are given below.
• DOMAIN i ; a domain managed by a single administrative authority, identified as i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (In the following definition, all sets with the subscript i are defined under the DOMAIN i .) • US ER i , ROLE i , OPR i , OBJ i : the set of users, roles, operations and objects.
• PERM i = OPR i × OBJ i : the set of permissions.
• S ES S ION i : the set of sessions.
• CROLE j : the set of interoperable or cooperative job functions, identified as j.
(1 ≤ j ≤ m) • UA i ⊆ US ER i × ROLE i : a many-to-many user-to-role relation.
• IUA i ⊆ US ER i × CROLE j : a many-to-many user-tocooperation role assignment relation.
• PA i ⊆ PERM i × ROLE i : a many-to-many role-topermission assignment relation.
• RT i ⊆ ROLE i × CROLE j : a many-to-many role-tocooperation role translation relation.
The session captures dynamics of the access context. We define the following functions for session management. • users on role(r : ROLE i ) → 2 US ER i : users assigned to a role r, namely, To query the available permissions to a given role or a cooperation role, the following functions are invoked:
• perms on role(r : ROLE i ) → 2 PERM i : permissions assigned to a role r, namely,
PERM k : permissions assigned to a cooperation role cr, i.e.,
-perms on crole(cr)
PA k ] 
Hiearachical Model of C-RBAC
A hierarchical model is built on the core C-RBAC model. We define the hierarchical model for roles as well as cooperation roles from two angles: permission inheritance and user membership inheritance since they are very important features of RBAC [8] . Permission inheritance is a wellknown property of RBAC: if there are partial ordering relations among roles, then an ancestor role has permissions of descendants'. The membership inheritance allows users assigned to an ancestor role to have the membership of descendant role as well. Note that we do not define a hierarchical relationship between roles and cooperation roles. This is consistent with our aim: separation of cooperation from the local policy domains.
• As there are two hierarchical structures-role and cooperation role hierarchy-management functions for permission inheritance are also defined separately.
• inherited perms on role(r : ROLE i ) → 2 PERM i , inherited permissions on role r, namely,
• authorized perms on role(r : ROLE i ) → 2 PERM i , authorized permissions on role r, defined as,
-authorized perms on role(r) = perms on role(r) ∪ inherited perms on role(r)
• inherited perms on crole(cr :
inherited permissions on a cooperation role cr, namely,
PA k ]
• authorized perms on crole(cr :
, authorized permissions on a cooperation role cr, defined as,
-authorized perms on crole(cr) = perms on crole(cr) ∪ inherited perms on crole(cr)
Functions for the user membership inheritance relation are given below.
• implicit users on role(r : ROLE i ) → 2 PERM i , users which have memberhship on role r, i.e., Now we can access local objects and foreign objects in distinct ways.
-implicit users on role(r) = {u ∈ US ER
i | (∃r > r)[(u, r ) ∈ UA i ]} •
Access Context of C-RBAC
Upon C-RBAC model, a certain local access is mediated by the following context. This is the story of some arbitrary domain DOMAIN i . All the accesses are confined to the domain DOMAIN i .
Definition 1:
Local-domain access context specified by
For a role r i , only users who are assigned to r i by UA i , can use permission o i which is assigned to r i by PA i . The user assignment and the permission assignment of DOMAIN i , UA i and PA i , respectively, are configured by the administrator of DOMAIN i .
Every inter-domain access must have the following collaborative context to cross its domain boundary. This is an instance in which two arbitrary domains, DOMAIN i and DOMAIN j , are involved and a user in DOMAIN i accesses an object in DOMAIN j .
Definition 2:
Inter-domain (collaborative) access context specified by
In a cooperation role cr k , an inter-domain access instance is meaningful only if each of the domains are translated to the common cooperation role with the role translation relation, RT i for DOMAIN i and RT j for DOMAIN j , respectively. The above access context is valid under contract with the administrator of each domain.
Implementation and Example
Here we present an example of cooperation composed by the C-RBAC model.
Implementation
We have developed SeeCure-NFS package to coordinate shared repository using NFS (Network File System) and SELinux (Security-Enhanced Linux) [18] system. SELinux is a trusted operating system which supports RBAC and Type Enforcement (TE) for access control enforcement. The SeeCure-NFS package consists of a simple version of the certification authority, PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) client, and shared repository manager (SRM) Fig. 5 . The simple version of CA and PKI client were made to simulate the public key infrastructure. Further, SRM depends on PKI to negotiate cooperation domains, i.e., cooperation role information and other items needed for the cooperation.
One Security Administrator (SA) of domains can be an initiator of cooperation policy negotiation while the server from other domains enforces common collaborative policy through SRM handled by each SA. After the completion of common policy possession, all local accesses are confined to local-domain access context through existing RBAC configuration in SELinux and all interactions are confined to inter-domain access context through negotiated policy.
RT (Role Translation) relation is implemented by assigning the same privileges to a cooperation role with a corresponding local role. IUA (Interoperable User Assignment) relation is realized by assigning users to cooperation roles in SELinux policy configuration.
In the following example, we set up three Linux systems (three domains) for simplicity, even though a single domain can, in general, consist of multiple systems. More systems and more cooperation can be realized with the extended configuration. Fig. 6 gives an example of cooperation tasks involving a university and two companies. They share a project repository according to appropriate positions. The project objective is to develop a web application which consists of the web and database modules. The web modules include web interface design as well as module programming. The two companies are involved in developing the web modules. The DB group students take charge of database programming for the project.
Example
After initiating the cooperation role hierarchy, the translation of each domain is carried out by the respective security administrator. A Professor in the university, a Manager in a company, and a Chief designer of the other company are translated to play Project Manager (PM). All of them require the right to use the permissions over the database programmer's role and the Web programmer's role in the cooperation domain. The privilege of Web programmer is the union of the web designer's permission in the design company and the development team 1's permission in the web software company. Table 2 shows the role hierarchy configuration for each Fig. 6 Example of cooperation. # Role Hierarchy for Univ. Lab dominance { role prof r { role os grp r { role stud r; } role db grp r { role stud r; } } } # Role Hierarchy for Web Design Company dominance { role cheif r { role design r { role empl r; } role coord r { role empl r; } } } # Role Hierarchy for Web Software Company dominance { role mgr r { role dev1 r { role empl r; } role dev2 r { role empl r; } } } # Cooperation Role Hierarchy dominance { role pm r { role db prg r { role mem r; } role web prg r { role mem r; } } } domain. They have the same cooperation role hierarchy after the cooperation negotiation. With the given role hierarchy, each domain constructs its own organization. With the common cooperation role hierarchy, all domains converge towards the cooperation. Each administrator assigns his roles to cooperation roles through SRM. Besides, some users are assigned to cooperation roles so as to enable them to be interoperable users.
Here we just mention the cooperative actions. The user, assigned to pm r (as a Project Manager) by IUA relation from any of the participating domains, tries to transit to web prg r (Web programmer in the cooperation) and this transition operation is allowed by the dominance relation of the cooperation role. Hence that user can read the file of Web programmer. On the other hand, any user assigned to Web programmer must not be able to access the file of Project Manager. The user assigned to web prg r is denied the transition operation to become a Project Manager. He is also denied the access operation on the directory of Project Manager.
As an example of the principle of separation of duties in the cooperation hierarchy, the user of db prg r (DB programmer) must not be able to access the directory of web prg r and vice versa.
Discussion
Granularity
Role-based access control, by its very nature, instantiates many local/collaborative access contexts. However, note that each context specifies the access instance from a single user to a single object thereby ensuring adequate finegrained access control.
Conflict Prevention
Any multi-domain RBAC model which takes the approaches described in section 3.1 can not provide adequate security.
These models do not provide scalability which is a very important, and useful, characteristic in multi-domain environments, because as more and more domains are involved, the chances of threat triggered from inadequate inter-domain security configuration will increase. As shown in section 3.1, the IRBAC [14] model which takes the role-to-role translation approach, can not accomodate more than two domains. This is due to possible infiltration and covert promotion attacks which are special kinds of implicit conflict in any cooperation policy.
However, the C-RBAC model focuses on the avoidance of conflict conditions in the following sense.
Domain Conflict
Subdividing the access context in two categories and only permitting accesses under those contexts, we achieve a clear separation between local accesses and inter-domain accesses. This leads to the formation of local domain and cooperation domain. Accordingly, there exist no direct associations of local subjects/objects with foreign roles, which reside in different domains. The clear separation precludes any inherent domain conflict.
Policy-Freeness
There are always inter-domain access rules generated by cooperation roles. No subject can cross the domain boundary without satisfying the collaborative access context which is equal to inter-domain access.
Moreover, IUA and RT relations restrict the privilege propagation. Namely, only the user who is assigned to a cooperation role by IUA relation can enjoy foreign privilege and this is restricted to a single hop. For example, if we set up an infiltration attack similar to that described in section 3.1 using C-RBAC, then The RT relation is a privilege assignment relation (from local domain to adjoining cooperation domain) so that D 3 can only confer his privelges to C 2 and C 4 , and can not pass the privileges of C 4 to C 2 . Hence, protection against infiltration is accomplished.
Rule Conflict
The separation of accesses prevents a local access rule from being interpreted as a foreign rule. Hence, the possibility of rule conflict decreases.
IUA and RT relation limit covert promotion described in section 3. With trusted interoperable actions, and exercise of care with conflicts, scalability is improved. Fig. 7 shows the scalability provision of the C-RBAC model supporting N domains and M cooperations.
Additional Benefits
The abstraction of the cooperation task, i.e., cooperation role, acts like a firewall. We also reap some additional benefits from the jurisdictional viewpoint. When a domain is interacting with another domain, which has exclusive authority from the former, there are chances to collect information concerning access control such as real identification of roles, permissions, and hierarchical structure of other domains, and the like. There also exists a potential threat as organizational information might be used for malicious purposes by the other domain after some interaction. However, the cooperation role makes this information transparent. One can hide the real information by mediating among domains. Hence, a domain's organizational information can be protected from the other domain which has exclusive authority over it.
The C-RBAC model treats the question of cooperation in an effective manner. Even though a domain changes roles frequently, there is no effect on other domains. The latter do not need to change their formation in order to adjust to the changed environment of the other side. This is achieved by the intermediation of cooperation.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed an extended RBAC modelthe C-RBAC-to support collaboration among TOSs in a multi-domain environment. Although RBAC is recognized as the most appropriate access control model in the commercial field, research efforts have addressed only single policy domains.
We have dealt with multiple domains. With a view to support fine-grained access control among the domains, we have followed the meta-policy approach which helps discriminate between local access and collaborative access quite effectively. Our model's major advantages are granularity of access, and scalability of cooperation. Protection of organizational information, and support of adhocratic organizations are additional benefits.
We have implemented a sample instance of the C-RBAC model in the Network File System (NFS) and Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux). We have plans to study runtime access conflict resolution strategies.
